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STUDENT COMMENTS
SMITH V. BOARD OF SCHOOL COMMISSIONERS:
THE RELIGION OF SECULAR HUMANISM IN
PUBLIC EDUCATION
STEVEN M. LEE*
[A] religious evacuation of the public square cannot be sus-
tained, either in concept or in practice. . . . When recog-
nizable religion is excluded, the vacuum will be filled by er-
satz religion, by religion bootlegged into public space under
other names .... 1
INTRODUCTION
In a society which has experienced both a dissipation of
moral consensus and a revival of religious fundamentalism,
moral education in public schools is a sensitive and poten-
tially volatile issue. Some would attempt to avert controversy
by placing morality beyond the purview of public school cur-
ricula. This solution, however, is highly specious. Both courts
and educators generally agree that some form of public
moral education is desirable, with the Supreme Court going
so far as to conclude that moral education is necessary to the
maintenance of a democratic society.2 Further, even if de-
sired, the elimination of moral education from public schools
* B.A. 1986, Doane College; J.D. 1989, University of Notre Dame;
Thos. J. White Scholar, 1987-89.
1. R. NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE: RELIGION AND DEMOCRACY
IN AMERICA 80 (1984) (emphasis in original).
2. In Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986), the
Court stated that public education's objective is "the 'inculcat[ion of] fun-
damental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political sys-
tem.' " Id. at 681 (quoting Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76-77 (1979)).
See also Purpel & Ryan, infra note 3, at 3 ("There is an increasing demand
for the schools to be a more forceful agent of moral development .... ");
Note, Humanistic Values in the Public School Curriculum: Problems in Defining
an Appropriate "Wall of Separation," 61 Nw. U. L. REV. 795, 804-06 (1966).
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is not possible. Indeed, "[iut is inconceivable for the schools
to take [a] child for six or seven hours a day, for 180 days a
year, from the time he is six to the time he is eighteen, and
not affect the way he thinks about moral issues .... "'
The issue, then, is not whether public schools should en-
gage in moral education, but rather how public schools
should engage in moral education. Traditional theistic reli-
gion once provided the framework." However, theistic reli-
gion's presence in public schools has declined, abetted by Su-
preme Court decisions calling for a strict separation of
church and state.' Public schools have replaced the theistic
framework with moral relativism,6 an approach that encour-
3. Purpel & Ryan, Moral Education: What Is It and Where Are We?, in
MORAL EDUCATION ... IT COMES WITH THE TERRITORY 9 (Purpel & Ryan
eds. 1976).
4. T. HILLWAY, EDUCATION IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 103 (1961). See W.
GRIFFITHS, RELIGION, THE COURTS, AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 1 (1966) (exer-
cises in public schools usually included reading the Bible, reciting prayers,
and singing hymns); Purpel & Ryan, supra note 3, at 4; Whitehead, judicial
Schizophrenia: The Family and Education in a Secular Society, J. CHRISTIAN JU-
RISPRUDENCE 49, 56-61 (1982).
5. See Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam) (striking
down a law requiring the posting of the Ten Commandments in public
schools), reh'g denied, 449 U.S. 1104 (1981); School Dist. of Abington
Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (prohibiting encouragement to
pray); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (prohibiting compelled prayer
in public schools); McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948)
(prohibiting schools from allowing voluntary, on-campus religious
instruction).
The secularization of public education was not completely a matter of
constitutional exclusion. The teaching of traditional Christian morality de-
clined as society's concepts of morality became more diverse. Industrializa-
tion depleted the role of the family as a morally unifying force, and mass
immigration introduced concepts of morality that conflicted with the for-
merly predominant Protestant view. Purpel & Ryan, supra note 3, at 4. In
order to accommodate an increasingly diverse constituency, public educa-
tion began to emphasize open inquiry as opposed to teaching set religious
values. Hafen, Developing Student Expression Through Institutional Authority:
Public Schools as Mediating Structures, 48 OHIO ST. L. J. 663, 668 n. 21
(1987). See also N. WOLTERSTORFF, RELIGION AND THE SCHOOLS 6-7 (1965)
(discussing the "erosion" of religious values from public education).
6. See Note, supra note 2, at 804 ("The major purpose behind the
emphasis upon moral and spiritual values in schools is to attempt to fill the
void created by the removal of religion from the schools."); Purpel & Ryan,
supra note 3, at 4 ("Cultural relativism and a supposed scientific objectivity
replaced Protestant moral theology" in public education.).
For a discussion of moral relativism, see Harman, Is There a Single True
Morality?, in MORALITY, REASON AND TRUTH: NEW ESSAYS ON THE FOUNDA-
TIONS OF ETHICS 27-48 (D. Copp & D. Zimmerman eds. 1985) (contrasting
moral relativism with moral absolutism).
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ages children to rely solely on internal referents in defining
their morality. Moral relativism has developed into an inte-
gral part of public education, apparent both as a general
principle and in designed curricula."
While moral relativism may be an appealing approach to
moral education in a pluralistic society, it has been argued
that moral relativism is tantamount to a secular religion. If
tantamount to religion, its presence in public classrooms cre-
ates an obvious disharmony with the Supreme Court's adher-
ence to the separation of religion and government. Smith v.
Board of School Commissioners' examines this disharmony by
addressing the religious nature of moral relativism. In Smith,
a group of parents and teachers in Alabama's Mobile County
argued that certain elements of the curriculum advanced a
''secular religion," violating the establishment clause of the
first amendment.9 The Smith plaintiffs convinced a federal
district court to ban a number of textbooks found to incul-
cate moral relativism through a humanistic approach to val-
ues education." Subsequently reversed," the district court's
decision illustrates the problems inherent in the Supreme
7. Note, The Establishment Clause, Secondary Religious Effects, and Hu-
manistic Education, 91 YALE L.J. 1196, 1205 (1982) (discussing the curricu-
lum of humanistic education).
8. 655 F. Supp. 939 (S.D. Ala.) (on remand), rev'd, 827 F.2d 684
(11 th Cir. 1987). Part of a continuing line of cases: Jaffree v. James [I], 554
F. Supp. 727 (S.D. Ala. 1982), later proceeding Jaffree v. Board of School
Comm'rs, 554 F. Supp. 1104 (S.D. Ala.) and Jaffree v. James [II], 554 F.
Supp. 1130 (S.D. Ala.), affd in part and rev'd in part, Jaffree v. Wallace,
705 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir.) (reconsolidated), reh'g denied, 713 F.2d 614
(11 th Cir. 1983), cert. granted in part, 466 U.S. 924 (1984), aff'd, 472 U.S.
38 (1985).
9. Smith, 655 F. Supp. at 946. The first amendment provides in full:
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend.
I. The first clause is referred to as the establishment clause. The second
clause is referred to as the free exercise clause. Taken together, the clauses
are known as the religion clauses.
10. Smith, 655 F. Supp. at 973. The plaintiffs also argued that the
promotion of secular humanism inhibits theistic religion by denying the
existence of absolute morality. The district court stated that "some reli-
gious beliefs are so fundamental that the act of denying them will com-
pletely undermine that religion." Id. at 987.
11. Smith v. Board of School Comm'rs, 827 F.2d 684 (11th Cir.
1987).
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Court's current establishment clause analysis, especially in the
sensitive area of public education.12
This note makes two main contentions: (1) that secular
humanism is a religion within the meaning of the first
amendment and (2) that humanistic approaches to values ed-
ucation in public schools impermissibly promote the religion
of secular humanism through the inculcation of moral rela-
tivism. To begin, Part I of this note briefly discusses the de-
velopment of the Supreme Court's existing establishment
clause jurisprudence. Part II summarizes Smith within that ju-
risprudential context. Part III considers the religious nature
of secular humanism, concluding that it is a religion for es-
tablishment clause purposes. Part IV examines the religious
effect of humanistic values education and offers a possible so-
lution to the secular humanism/humanistic values education
quandary.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
The first amendment of the United States Constitution
provides, in pertinent part: "Congress shall make no law re-
specting an establishment of religion .... "I' The Supreme
Court has found this language "at best opaque,""' making
the development of establishment clause jurisprudence a diffi-
cult task. Since the establishment clause was first applied to
the states in 1947,' 6 the Court has based its jurisprudence on
separation doctrine, a doctrine that promotes neutrality 6 to-
12. In Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968), the Supreme Court
stated that the pervasive influence of public education over the children
who are compelled to attend them creates a context of analysis requiring
scrupulous compliance with the establishment clause. Id. at 104-05. See also
Edwards v. Aguillard, 107 S. Ct. 2573, 2578 (1987) ("[I]n employing the
three-pronged Lemon test, we must do so mindful of the particular con-
cerns that arise in the context of public elementary and secondary
schools.") (the Lemon test is discussed infra text accompanying notes 50-64).
13. U.S. CONST. amend. I. For the full text of the amendment, see
supra note 9.
14. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
15. See infra note 23.
16. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 60 (1985) (The State "must
pursue a course of complete neutrality toward religion." (footnote omit-
ted)). See also, e.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756
(1973); McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948); Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1
(1947). For an extended discussion of various characterizations of neutral-
ity, see L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-7 (2d ed. 1988).
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ward religion through the separation of religion from
government.17
Separation doctrine has proven to be a problematic basis
of analysis because it is underpinned by two tenuous assump-
tions:1s (1) that church and state are separable entities and (2)
that a readily apparent distinction between the religious and
the secular exists."' Over time these assumptions have been
challenged by the growth of government and a prolific diver-
sification of religion, 0 creating tension between the Court's
adherence to strict separation and social reality." Conse-
quently, the Court's opinions have been marred by confusion
and inconsistency. 2
Separation jurisprudence has evolved from strict separa-
tion, a rigid approach which attempts to completely divide re-
ligion and government, to the Lemon test, a more flexible ap-
proach that recognizes some overlap between the two.
17. "That doctrine [strict separation] prohibits any interaction what-
soever between institutions of government and those of religion." Tushnet,
infra note 22, at 705 (footnote omitted). See generally L. PFEFFER, CHURCH,
STATE AND FREEDOM (1953).
18. Strict separation is also based on the assumption that separation
is mandated by the Constitution. See infra notes 213-20 and accompanying
text.
19. Implicit in separation doctrine is the assumption that the reli-
gious and the secular are each confined to distinct spheres of reality. This
note contends that ostensibly secular beliefs have overlapped into the
sphere of religion through religious diversification. Concerns relating to
mankind, culture, science, philosophy, etc. often fall within the sphere of
religion in today's society. See RELIGIOUS COMMITMENT AND SECULARIZATION:
READINGS IN SECULAR AND THEISTIC RELIGION viii (C. Card & R. Ammerman
eds. 1974) ("The idea of 'secular religion' no longer strikes one as a con-
tradiction in terms.").
20. See infra note 128 and accompanying text. See also supra note 19.
21. Moreover, strict separation conflicts with the free exercise clause,
which requires the government to affirmatively accommodate religion in
some instances. See infra note 52 and accompanying text.
22. See Tushnet, The Constitution of Religion, 18 CONN. L. REV. 701,
701-02 (1986). As an example of contradictions, the Court has held that
the state may provide sectarian schools with secular textbooks, but may not
provide them with educational equipment like maps and globes. Meek v.
Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 354-55 (1975). For another example, compare,
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (the state may reimburse
parents who send their children to sectarian schools for transportation
costs) (for a brief discussion of the case, see infra notes 23-28 and accompa-
nying text) with Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 252-53 (1977) (the state
may not reimburse sectarian schools for field trip transportation costs). See
also Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling the Con-
flict, 41 U. PrI-r L. REV. 673, 680 (1980).
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A. Strict Separation
The Court first articulated its commitment to strict sepa-
ration in Everson v. Board of Education.2" In Everson, the Court
considered the constitutionality of a public school system re-
imbursing parents for costs incurred in transporting their
children to sectarian schools. Although the Court affirmed
the validity of the practice because of a perceived secular
purpose and effect, namely, the safe, expedient transporta-
tion of children to and from school,24 it announced that the
establishment clause requires the strict separation of religion
and government.25 Writing for the Court, Justice Black de-
clared, "The First Amendment has erected a wall between
church and state. That wall must be kept high and
impregnable." 26
Though the Everson Court was unanimous in its pro-
nouncement that the establishment clause requires strict sep-
aration, it divided 5-4 on the issue of whether the reimburse-
ment practice was permissible. The majority's reluctance to
apply strict separation in a manner consistent with its rheto-
ric implied an early recognition of strict separation's func-
tional shortcomings.28 Nevertheless, the rhetorical commit-
ment to strict separation was emphasized less than two years
later in McCollum v. Board of Education." The McCollum
Court found unconstitutional the practice of an Illinois public
school district allowing religious-instruction classes during
23. 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (for the first time applying the establishment
clause to the states).
24. Id. at 18.
25. Id. at 16.
26. Id. at 18. The "wall of separation" metaphor was written by
Thomas Jefferson in a letter to the Danbury Baptist Association in 1802.
Jefferson wrote, "[I] contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the
whole American people which declared that their legislature should 'make
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free ex-
ercise thereof,' thus building a wall of separation between church and
State." T. JEFFERSON, WRITINGS 510 (M. Peterson ed. 1984).
27. Justices Jackson, Burton, Frankfurter and Rutledge dissented,
finding the reimbursement practices unconstitutional in light of strict sepa-
ration. See generally Everson, 330 U.S. at 18-28 (Jackson, J., dissenting), 28-
74 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
28. "[T]he undertones of the opinion, advocating complete and un-
compromising separation of Church from State, seem utterly discordant
with its conclusion yielding support to their commingling in educational
matters." Id. at 19 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
29. 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
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school hours on school premises."0 The "release-time" ar-
rangement permitted outside teachers, employed by private
religious groups, to give religious instruction to willing stu-
dents who had secured parental permission. 1 Finding that
the arrangement was an impermissible use of the tax-sup-
ported school system to aid religious groups,3" the Court in-
voked the "wall-of-separation" metaphor. 3
As America moved into the 1950s the tension inherent
in strict separation began to surface." This tension was re-
flected in Zorach v. Clauson,85 where the Court upheld the va-
lidity of a "release-time" program similar to the program in-
validated in McCollum."' In Zorach, the Court refined its
establishment clause rhetoric stating, "The First Amendment
. . .does not say that in every and all respects there shall be
a separation . . . .Rather . . .there shall be no concert or
union or dependency one on the other. '3 7 The Court also
explicitly recognized that government may, in some in-
stances, affirmatively accommodate an individual's religious
needs without violating the establishment clause. 8
Ten years after Zorach, the Court heard the controversial
"school prayer" cases, Engel v. Vitale"9 and School District of
Abington Township v. Schempp." In Engel, a New York school
board directed the daily recitation of a nondenominational
prayer at the commencement of each school day."' The state
30. Id. at 207.
31. Id. at 205-06.
32. Id. at 206.
33. Id. at 211.
34. See infra note 51.
35. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
36. In Zorach, the practice of the New York City school system in
releasing students during school hours to attend religious courses was
found constitutional. The Court distinguished the case from McCollum on
the ground that off-campus religious instruction presented a problem dif-
ferent from the on-campus religious instruction. Id. at 308-09.
37. Id. at 312.
38. Id. at 313-14 ("When the state encourages religious instruction
or cooperates with religious authorities by adjusting the schedule of public
events to sectarian needs, it follows the best of our traditions.").
39. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
40. 374 U.S. 203 (1963). For a good analysis of the Court's religion
clause jurisprudence in light of its school prayer decisions, see generally C.
RICE, THE SUPREME COURT AND PUBLIC PRAYER: THE NEED FOR RESTRAINT
(1964) (with particular attention to pp. 3-22 (criticizing the Court for pay-
ing deference to a small anti-God minority while ignoring the pro-God
majority)).
41. Engel, 370 U.S. at 422.
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argued that the prayer practices were constitutionally permis-
sible because the school did not compel student participa-
tion."2 The Court rejected this argument, holding that the
establishment clause does not depend upon a showing of
overt compulsion. Encouragement, the Court found, is indi-
rect coercion and is violative of the clause.'
Following on the heels of Engel, Schempp represented the
Court's first attempt to promulgate a formal test for constitu-
tionality under the establishment clause. In that case, the
Court found unconstitutional a Pennsylvania statute requir-
ing the reading of Bible verses in public school classrooms,"
even though the school district proposed a number of valid
secular purposes.' 5 The Court held that the avowed secular
purposes failed to overcome the religious character of the ex-
ercise."' Thus, the finding of a secular purpose does not end
establishment clause analysis. The court proposed:
The test may be stated as follows: what are the purpose
and the primary effect of the enactment? If either is the
advancement or inhibition of religion then the enactment
exceeds the scope of legislative power as circumscribed by
the Constitution. That is to say that to withstand the stric-
tures of the Establishment Clause there must be a secular
legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither ad-
vances nor inhibits religion.4
A second major development in Schempp was a further
refinement of the Court's rhetoric. In delivering the Schempp
opinion, Justice Clark wrote not of separation, but rather of
"wholesome neutrality."' 8 In referring to Everson, Clark did
not invoke the "wall-of-separation" metaphor. He instead
wrote, "[T]he [Everson] Court held that the [first] Amend-
ment 'requires the state to be neutral in its relations with
groups of religious believers and non-believers .... "-i
42. Id. at 430.
43. Id. at 431.
44. The Court disallowed the practice even though the statute ex-
cused children from the readings at their parents' request. Schempp, 374
U.S. at 205.
45. The lower court identified the promotion of moral values, the
contradiction of materialistic trends, the perpetuation of social institutions,
and the teaching of literature as secular purposes of in-class Bible reading.
Id. at 223.
46. Id. at 224.
47. Id. at 222.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 218 (quoting Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18
(1947)).
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B. The Lemon Test
The shift of focus from separation to neutrality reflected
what Zorach had foreshadowed: the Court's realization that
absolute separation is not possible. Government had become
too pervasive to remain completely uninvolved in religion,5"
and religion had diversified to the extent that distinctions be-
tween the secular and the religious were not always clear."
Further, it had become apparent that strict adherence to sep-
aration necessarily conflicted with the free exercise clause,
which often mandates an accommodation of religion. 2 In
light of these developments, the Court sought an increased
flexibility that would reconcile the necessary overlaps be-
tween government activity and religion.
Establishment clause jurisprudence found a certain stasis
in Lemon v. Kurtzman,54 where the Court examined the "cu-
mulative criteria developed . . . over [the] years ' 55 and dis-
tilled a comprehensive, if somewhat formalistic, test. The so-
50. See Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 745-46 (1976)
("A system of government that makes itself felt as pervasively as ours could
hardly be expected never to cross paths with the church. . . . [A] hermetic
separation of the two is an impossibility .... "). See also L. TRIBE, supra
note 16, § 14-6, at 1185 ("[T]he reach of the state has . . . grown....
[and als a consequence, church concerns often overlap substantially with
state concerns.").
51. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. See also infra note 128
and accompanying text.52. In Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), the Court held that
the state must accommodate certain religious beliefs, finding that Amish
children were exempt from mandatory school attendance requirements be-
cause attending public schools would undermine their religious faith. Id. at
210-12. See also Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 388 (1963) (holding that the
state may not deny unemployment benefits to a Seventh-Day Adventist
who, for religious reasons, would not work on Saturdays).
53. In Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970), the Court stated
that government could accommodate religion as long as it maintained "be-
nevolent neutrality": "[W]e will not tolerate either governmentally estab-
lished religion or governmental interference with religion. Short of those
expressly proscribed governmental acts there is room for play in the joints
productive of benevolent neutrality which will permit religious exercise to
exist without sponsorship and without interference." Id. at 669.
54. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). In Lemon, the Court invalidated a Rhode
Island statute authorizing a 15% salary supplement for teachers in nonpub-
lic schools and a Pennsylvania statute authorizing the state to reimburse
nonpublic schools for certain teacher services and school materials. The
statutes were found to excessively entangle government with religion. Id. at
625.
55. Id. at 612.
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called Lemon test, a product of the more flexible attitude the
Court had adopted, is comprised of three parts.56 Part one
requires a clearly secular purpose behind a governmental ac-
tivity. Part two prohibits the activity from having a primary
effect of either advancing or inhibiting religion. Part three
prohibits "excessive entanglement" between government and
religion.5 That this test represented a shift from rigid adher-
ence to strict separation is reflected in Chief Justice Burger's
observation that "the line of separation, far from being a
'wall,' is a blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier .... ",8
While the more flexible approach has recognized the
possibility of some governmental aid to religious schools"
and limited accommodation of religion in public schools,"'
the majority of recent establishment clause cases has reiter-
ated the settled proposition that public schools are secular in-
stitutions.61 The express goal of "wholesome or benevolent
neutrality' '62 is neutrality between religion and irreligion, not
merely among religions." Therefore, the government may
56. Id. at 612-13.
57. See Walz, 397 U.S. at 669 (first positing the "excessive entangle-
ment" prohibition). The entanglement part of the Lemon test has devel-
oped into a two-tiered approach. The first tier prohibits governmental ac-
tivity that fosters "serious potential for divisive conflict over the issue of
aid to religion .... ." Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 372 (1975). The
second tier prohibits governmental activities that require comprehensive
and continuing state surveillance. Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist,
413 U.S. 756, 797 (1973).
58. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614.
59. Id. at 616-17 (acknowledging that the establishment clause per-
mits government to provide sectarian schools with certain services). See
supra note 53 and accompanying text.
60. See supra note 52.
61. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (striking down an
Alabama statute authorizing a moment of silence for prayer or meditation)
(for a brief discussion of the case, see infra notes 70-86 and accompanying
text); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam) (striking down a
Kentucky statute requiring the posting of the Ten Commandments in pub-
lic school classrooms), reh'g denied, 449 U.S. 1104 (1981).
62. The term wholesome neutrality was first used by the Court in
School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (see
supra note 48 and accompanying text). Benevolent neutrality was first
adopted in Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (see supra note 53).
63. "[The first] Amendment requires the state to be a neutral in its
relations with groups of religious believers and nonbelievers ....... Ever-
son v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947). "Neither a state nor the
Federal Government can . . . .aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer
one religion over another .. " Id. at 15 (emphasis added). For an objec-
tion to the Court's position, see Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 106 (1985)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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not favor or promote religion even as a general subject mat-
ter in a nondiscriminatory manner. Thus, the judicial view
put forth in Lemon represents a refinement of separation doc-
trine, not its abandonment; that is, the Court now seeks sepa-
ration between church and state to the greatest practical
extent.
4
In Lynch v. Donnelly,65 the Supreme Court expressed an
unwillingness to be confined to the Lemon test.66 Neverthe-
less, Lemon clearly remains a staple in matters of public edu-
cation. The Court recently noted that it has "particularly re-
lied on Lemon in every case involving the sensitive
relationship between government and religion in the educa-
tion of our children." 67 The Lemon test was used by both the
federal district court and the appellate court in adjudicating
Smith v. Board of School Commissioners.
II. SMITH V. BOARD OF SCHOOL COMMISSIONERS
The plaintiffs in Smith asserted that secular humanism is
a religion and that the public school curriculum advanced
that religion in violation of the establishment clause. Specifi-
cally, the plaintiffs argued that certain textbooks actively pro-
moted secular humanism by inculcating a relativistic moral
system and that, therefore, the school district could be en-
joined from using the books. 8
64. "The objective is to prevent, as far as possible, the intrusion of
either into the precincts of the other." Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,
614 (1971). Some commentators urge a return to strict separation. See
Note, Rebuilding the Wall: The Case for a Return to the Strict Interpretation of
the Establishment Clause, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1463 (1981). See also Committee
for Pub. Educ. v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 671 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
("I would resurrect the 'high and impregnable' wall between church and
state constructed by the Framers of the First Amendment." (citation
omitted)).
65. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
66. Id. at 679. In Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983), the
Court did not apply the Lemon test in upholding the constitutionality of
chaplaincy and prayer in the Nebraska legislature. The Court held that the
legislative practice of opening sessions with a chaplain's prayer has become
a "part of the fabric of our society. . . . [and] is simply a tolerable ac-
knowledgment of beliefs widely held among people of this country." Id. at
792.
67. School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 383 (1985).
68. Smith v. Board of School Comm'rs, 655 F. Supp. 939 (S.D. Ala.
1987). The plaintiffs also argued that the texts inhibited traditional reli-
gions by ignoring their historical and social significance. That issue is sepa-
rate from the issue of this note-whether secular humanism is promoted in
the classroom in violation of the establishment clause as an advancement of
religion. See infra note 86.
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A. Background
Smith began as an intervention in Jaffree v. Wallace.69 In
1982, Ishmael Jaffree brought an action against Mobile
County's school board and the state of Alabama.7 0 The com-
plaint challenged the constitutionality of certain prayer activi-
ties and three statutes authorizing the activities. The statutes
authorized, respectively, a minute of silence for meditation, a
minute of silence for prayer or meditation, and a prescribed
teacher-led prayer.7 1 Specifically, Jaffree objected to organ-
69. 705 F.2d 1526 (11 th Cir.), reh'g and reh'g en banc denied, (11 th
Cir. 1983), affd, 472 U.S. 38 (1985). At the district court level the case was
bifurcated into Jaffree v. Board of School Comm'rs, 554 F. Supp. 1104
(S.D. Ala.), and Jaffree v. James, 554 F. Supp. 1130 (S.D. Ala. 1983), sepa-
rating the action against the school board from that against the state. The
appellate court subsequently reconsolidated the case and nominated it Jaf-
free v. Wallace, as the original defendant Governor Fob James had been
replaced in office by George Wallace. Smith, 655 F. Supp. at 942. For the
complete procedural history, see supra note 8.
70. The action was brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982),
which provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regu-
lation, custom, or usage, or any State or Territory or the District
of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other persons within the jurisdiction thereof to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress . ..
71. ALA. CODE § 16-1-20 (1975 & Supp. 1987) provided:
At the commencement of the first class each day in the first
through the sixth grades in all public schools, the teacher in
charge of the room in which each such class is held shall announce
that a period of silence, not to exceed one minute in duration,
shall be observed for meditation, and during any such period si-
lence shall be maintained and no activities engaged in.
ALA. CODE § 16-1-20.1 (1975 & Supp. 1987) provided:
At the commencement of the first class of each day in all grades
in all public schools, the teacher in charge of the room in which
each such class is held may announce that a period of silence not
to exceed one minute in duration shall be observed for meditation
or voluntary prayer, and during any such period no other activi-
ties shall be engaged in.
ALA. CODE § 16-1-20.2 (1975 & Supp. 1987) provided:
From henceforth, any teacher or professor in any public educa-
tional institution within the state of Alabama, recognizing that the
Lord God is one, at the beginning of any homeroom or any class,
may pray, may lead willing students in prayer, or may lead the
willing students in the following prayer to God:
(prayer omitted).
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ized prayer in Mobile County school rooms when his children
were in attendance."' He sought an injunction against in-class
prayer and a declaratory judgment that the statutes violated
the establishment clause. 8
Douglas T. Smith, a public school instructor, and over
600 other teachers and parents filed a motion to intervene in
the action alleging that the injunction would violate their
right to free exercise of religion."4 Alternatively, the inter-
venors pled that if the injunction was granted, it also should
be enforced against "the religions of secularism, humanism,
evolution, materialism, agnosticism, atheism and others. ' 7 5
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Alabama, in an opinion by Judge W. Brevard Hand, denied
Jaffree any relief and dismissed the action for failing to state
a claim." Because the court found that the establishment
clause did not apply against the states, the Lemon test was not
even considered. 7
72. Pixie Alexander led her class in a daily recitation of the Lord's
Prayer at Craighead Elementary School. Jaffree v. Board of Commission-
ers, 554 F. Supp. 1104, 1107 (S.D. Ala. 1983). Julia Green, an instructor at
Morningside Elementary School, frequently led her class in a recitation of
"For health and strength and daily food,/we praise Thy name, Oh Lord."
Id. And Charlene Boyd, an instructor at E.R. Dickson Elementary School,
led her class each day in the following recitation: "God is great, God is
good,/let us thank him for our food,/bow our heads we all are fed,/give
us Lord our daily bread./Amenl" Id. All three teachers continued their
practices after being apprised of Jaffree's objections. Id. at 1107-08.
73. Smith v. Board of School Comm'rs, 655 F. Supp. 939, 942 (S.D.
Ala. 1987).
74. Id. The free exercise clause argument was never considered in
Jaffree or Smith. For a good illustration of free exercise clause analysis in a
similar context, see Mozert v. Hawkins County Pub. Schools, 647 F. Supp.
1194 (E.D. Tenn. 1986), rev'd, 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir.), reh'g and reh'g en
banc denied, (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1029 (1988). See also,
Michael, The Free Exercise Clause: Can Mandatory Use of Certain Textbooks Be
Protected Conduct? 3 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 469 (1988).
75. Smith, 655 F. Supp. at 942.
76. Jaffree v. James, 554 F. Supp. 1130, 1132 (S.D. Ala. 1983). The
case was dismissed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
77. Jaffree v. Board of School Comm'rs, 544 F. Supp. 1104, 1118
(S.D. Ala. 1983). Judge Hand reasoned by way of historical analysis that
the framers intended the establishment clause only to apply against the fed-
eral government and that the fourteenth amendment did not incorporate
the clause against the states. Id. at 1113-29.
The decision was contrary to settled precedent. See, e.g., School Dist. of
Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370
U.S. 421 (1962); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); McCollum v.
Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S.
1 (1947).
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit reversed, finding that the first amendment protection
against establishment of religion applies to the states by in-
corporation through the fourteenth amendment." The court
went on to hold that .the questioned prayer activities and the
statutes authorizing a moment of silence for prayer or medi-
tation and a teacher-led prayer violated the establishment
clause under the criteria set forth in Lemon.y In the appellate
court's judgment, the statutes were not motivated by a clearly
secular purpose; and, they had a primary effect of advancing
religion."0 The United States Supreme Court affirmed the ap-
pellate court in a 6-3 decision," with Chief Justice Burger,
Justice White, and Justice Rehnquist dissenting. 2
Judge Hand quoted Justice William 0. Douglas in support of his
position:
"A judge looking at a constitutional decision may have compul-
sions to reverse past history and accept what was once written. But
he remembers above all else that it is the Constitution which he
swore to support and defend, not the gloss which his predecessors
may have put on it."
Jaffree, 554 F. Supp. at 1127 (quoting Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM. L.
REv. 735, 736 (1949)).
78. Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F.2d 1526, 1532 (1 1th Cir. 1983) ("[T]he
Supreme Court has considered and decided the historical implications surround-
ing the establishment clause. The Supreme Court has concluded that its pre-
sent interpretation of the first and fourteenth amendments is consistent
with historical evidence." (emphasis in original)).
79. Id. at 1536. The court made no ruling on Ala. Code § 16-1-20
(authorizing a minute of silence for meditation). For the full text of the
provision, see supra note 71.
80. Jaffree, 705 F.2d at 1535.
81. 472 U.S. 38 (1984). Only Ala. Code § 16-1-20.1 (authorizing a
minute of silence for prayer or meditation) was at issue in the case before
the Court. Id. The Court denied certiorari on the issue of school prayer
activities. Board of School Comm'rs v. Jaffree, 466 U.S. 926 (No. 83-804,
1984). The Court affirmed the appellate court's judgment as it pertained to
Ala. Code § 16-1-20.2 (authorizing teacher-led prayer) in the order grant-
ing certiorari. Wallace v. Jaffree and Smith v. Jaffree, 466 U.S. 924 (Nos.
83-812 and 83-929, 1984). For the full text of the statutes, see supra note
71.
82. In dissent, Justice Rehnquist argued that the Court has miscon-
ceived the true purpose of the establishment clause, positing that the clause
was designed not to maintain a neutrality between religion and irreligion,
rather only to prevent the federal government from establishing a national
religion. Therefore, under his analysis, the Alabama statutes and "related
prayer activities were permissible. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 91-114 (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting).
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On remand, the district court issued an order enjoining
the unconstitutional statutes and activities. 83 Jaffree withdrew
from the controversy,84 and the alternative petition of the in-
tervenors-that no establishment of any religion, including
secular humanism, should be allowed-was considered.85 The
court realigned the parties making the original intervenors
(Smith et al.) the plaintiffs, with the case recaptioned Smith v.
Board of School Commissioners.
B. The District Court Opinion in Smith
Judge Hand granted an injunction in favor of the plain-
tiffs, banning five textbooks.88 The texts, all approved by the
state, fell under the subject heading of home economics.8
The parties agreed that a valid secular purpose for using the
books existed and that use of the books did not constitute an
excessive entanglement of government and religion, thereby
satisfying the Lemon test's first and third prongs.88 The court
considered only the second prong-whether the activity had
a primary effect of either advancing or inhibiting religion.89
Relying on the testimony of numerous experts,9" the
court found secular humanism to be a belief system that
83. Smith v. Board of School Comm'rs, 655 F. Supp. 939, 943 (S.D.
Ala. 1987).
84. The district court extended to the original plaintiffs the right to
withdraw. Jaffree et al. made, and were granted, a motion to this effect. Id.
at 943-44.
85. In the original Jaffree opinion, the district court reserved the
right to "look again at the record ... and reach conclusions which it [was
not then] forced to reach." Jaffree v. Board of School Comm'rs, 554 F.
Supp. 1104, 1129 (S.D. Ala. 1983). The court identified issues not reached
as including the establishment clause challenge to the teaching of secular
humanism. Id. at 1129 n. 41.
86. Forty-four textbooks were actually banned. Thirty-nine were
found unconstitutional because they failed to adequately discuss religion.
This note does not consider the issue of whether a failure to adequately
discuss religion violates the establishment clause. This note will focus on
the five home economics texts found to affirmatively promote secular hu-
manism. See supra note 68.
87. H. McGINLEY, CARING, DECIDING AND GROWING (1983); V. RYDER,
CONTEMPORARY LIVING (1981, 1985); F. PARNELL, HOMEMAKING: SKILLS FOR
EVERYDAY LIVING (1981, 1984); V. CHAMBERLAIN, TEEN GUIDE (1985); J.
KELLY, TODAY'S TEEN (1981). See Smith, 655 F. Supp. at 988.
88. Smith v. Board of School Comm'rs, 827 F.2d 684, 690 (11 th Cir.
1987).
89. Id.
90. The experts included: Dr. Russell Kirk (B.A., Michigan State
University; M.A., Duke University; D.Litt., St. Andrews University (Scot-
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"makes a statement about supernatural existence a central
pillar of its logic; defines the nature of man; sets forth a goal
or purpose for individual and collective human existence; and
defines the nature of the universe, and thereby delimits its
purpose."91  Under an expansive definition of religion
gleaned from Supreme Court precedent, 92 the court found
secular humanism to be a religion for establishment clause
purposes. 93
The court then ruled that the banned texts inculcated
moral relativism, which the court found to be a manifestation
of secular humanism, through a humanistic approach to val-
ues education.94 In the court's view, the texts promoted that
moral choice is merely a matter of preference and that pref-
erence should be determined through a consideration of tem-
poral consequences.9" Describing the curriculum as a "relativ-
istic and individualistic approach [which] constitutes the
promotion of a fundamental faith claim,"" the court found
the texts unconstitutional as an advancement of religion.9"
C. The Appellate Court Opinion
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed
the decision of the district court without reaching the issue of
whether secular humanism is a religion.9" The appellate
court held that even if secular humanism is a religion, the
banned texts were not unconstitutional. 99 In concluding that
the banned texts did not violate the establishment clause, the
land)), Dr. Richard Baer, Jr. (A.B., Syracuse University; B.D., Princeton
Theological Seminary; Ph.D., Harvard University), Dr. William R. Coulson(B.A., Arizona State University; M.A., Ph.D., University of Notre Dame;
Ed.D., University of California-Berkley), Dr. Paul Kurtz (B.A., New York
University; M.A., Ph.D., Columbia University), Dr. James Hitchcock (A.B.,
St. Louis University; M.A., Ph.D., Princeton University), Dr. Robert Coles(A.B., Harvard College; M.D., Columbia University). See Smith v. Board of
School Comm'rs, 655 F. Supp. 939, 996-97 app. G-L (S.D. Ala. 1987).
91. Id. at 980.
92. See infra notes 126-48 and accompanying text.
93. Smith, 655 F.2d at 982.
94. Id. at 987.
95. Id. at 986.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 987.
98. Smith v. Board of School Comm'rs, 827 F.2d 684, 695 (11 th Cir.
1987).
99. Id. at 689.
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circuit court found that the value- system promoted by the
books was neutral toward religion. 00
The circuit court stated that any benefit to the religion
of secular humanism was only indirect, remote, and inciden-
tal, not constituting a violation of the Lemon test.' ° More-
over, the court relied on language in Justice O'Connor's con-
currence to. Lynch, stating that " '[t]he effect prong [of the
Lemon test] asks whether, irrespective of government's actual
purpose, the practice under review in fact conveys a message
of endorsement or disapproval.' "02 The circuit court held
that the home economics texts did not endorse secular hu-
manism, finding that the message conveyed reflects only "a
governmental attempt to instill in Alabama public school chil-
dren such values as independent thought, tolerance of di-
verse views, self-respect, maturity, self-reliance and logical de-
cision-making."' 0 The court then concluded, "This is an
entirely appropriate secular effect."'"
III. SECULAR HUMANISM AS RELIGION
To violate the second prong of the Lemon test an activity
must either advance or inhibit religion. 05 Although conven-
tional definitions of religion'08 might exclude secular human-
ism, the following discussion will reveal that secular human-
ism is a religion within the meaning of the first amendment.
A. What is Secular Humanism?
Depending upon the historical context, the term human-
ism has different meanings.107 Although derived from Greek
100. Id. at 690.
101. Id. at 691.
102. Id. at 690 (citation omitted).
103. Id. at 692.
104. Id.
105. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
106. "[T]he personal commitment to and serving of God or a god
with worshipful devotion, conduct in accord with divine commands esp. as
found in accepted sacred writings or declared by authoritative teachers
.... "WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1918 (1986).
107. Melnick, Secularism in the Law: The Religion of Secular Humanism,
8 OHIO N. U. L. REV. 329, 335 (1981). Early humanism can be traced back
to ancient Greece, where "supremacy of reason was the order of the
day. . . . [and] civil law and emperor rose to the level of a god .. " Id.
at 335 n. 36. In more modern times, humanism resurged during the Ren-
aissance and grew during the Enlightenment's Age of Reason. d. at 335.
See also J. VAN PRAAG, FOUNDATIONS OF HUMANISM 21-26 (J. Herget trans.
2d ed. 1982) (chronicling humanism of "antiquity").
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and Renaissance humanism, modern secular humanism bears
only a superficial resemblance to those philosophies.'08 Mod-
ern secular humanism is a comprehensive man-centered be-
lief system describing no single organized movement, but
rather the unifying principles that relate a number of organ-
ized movements and countless individuals.'09 One commenta-
tor has examined various characterizations of secular human-
ism and has formulated a two-part definition:
1) The placement of human and worldly concerns
above concerns about God or the supernatural. This prong
has two elements: (a) the denial of, or skepticism about, the
existence of the supernatural or the denial of its relevance
in the natural world, and (b) corresponding emphasis on the
importance of humans and the concerns of the temporal
world; and
2) Confidence in reason, which also includes two ele-
ments: (a) belief in the importance of science and technol-
ogy as a method of improving the world, and (b) a system of
ethics based on reason rather than on an external source
dictating ethical behavior. 1
Modern secular humanism appeared in the United States
as a social phenomenon in the late nineteenth century."'
Charles Darwin's theories pertaining to the origin of life
helped launch secular humanism into mainstream American
108. M. OLDS, RELIGIOUS HUMANISM IN AMERICA: DEITRICH, REESE, AND
POTTER 5-7 (1978).
109. "Humanist Manifesto II" proclaims that secular humanism "af-
firm[s] a set of common principles that can serve as a basis for united ac-
tion . . . " Humanist Manifesto II, supra note 19, at 5.
110. Freed, Secular Humanism, the Establishment Clause, and Public Ed-
ucation, 61 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1149, 1156 (1986) (footnotes omitted).
John Whitehead and John Conlan have identified six specific tenets of
secular humanism:
1) Denial of supernatural agencies.
2) Belief in the supremacy of human reason.
3) Belief in the inevitability of progress.
4) Belief in science as the guide to human progress and the ulti-
mate provider of an alternative to both religion and morals.
5) Belief in the self-sufficiency and centrality of man.
6) Belief in the absolutism of evolution.
Whitehead & Conlan, The Establishment of the Religion of Secular Humanism
and Its First Amendment Implications, 10 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1, 37-44 (1978).
See also Scheib, Secular Humanism as a Religion Within the Meaning of the First
Amendment: Grove v. Mead School District, 61 TULANE L. REV. 453, 464-65
(1986).
111. Whitehead & Conlan, supra note 110, at 27-29.
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culture by offering a viable alternative to divine creation.112
The emergence of Darwinism is also said to have fostered a
mentality hostile to objective morality in favor of the belief
that morality is temporal and subjective.11
Relativistic morality was a founding principle of the or-
ganized secular humanism movements that emerged in the
early part of this century.11 4 These movements were charac-
terized by coherent organizational structures and formal
methods of proselytization.115 After World War II, the
growth of secular humanist movements accelerated, both in
their numbers and in the scope of their activities." 6 Today,
secular humanism is a widely-accepted philosophy. Although
secular humanism has been called "the dominant religion of
our time," ''7 categorizing it as a religion for establishment
clause purposes requires adoption of a fairly broad, and non-
traditional, definition of religion.
B. Defining Religion
Religion does not lend itself to a single compendious def-
inition.1 8 Some scholars would restrict religion's definition to
112. Darwin's theories provided the basis for a complex theory con-
cerning the origin of man. Called "biological evolution" or "biological
Darwinism," the theory traces man's development from single celled-life
forms to fish, from fish to amphibian, from amphibian to reptile, and from
reptile to mammal. The theory further posits that as a mammal, man de-
veloped from the lower-primate ape to humanoid. See generally L. GAMLIN
& G. VINES, THE EVOLUTION OF LIFE (1987).
113. Whitehead & Conlan, supra note 110, at 28-29 (discussing how
"survival of the fittest" had become a code of behavior especially in busi-
ness practices).
114. J. VAN PRAAG, supra note 107, at 45.
115. Id. at 48-52.
116. Id.
117. D. EHRENFELD, THE ARROGANCE OF HUMANISM 3 (1978).
118. The ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY lists a survey that reveals
many different definitions. That survey includes the following: "Religion is
the belief in an ever living God, that is, in a Divine Mind and Will ruling
the Universe and holding moral relations with mankind." - James Marti-
neau; "Religion is the recognition that all things are manifestations of a
Power which transcends our knowledge." - Herbert Spencer; "Religion is
" rather the attempt to express the complete reality of goodness through
every aspect of our being." - F.H. Bradley; "Religion is ethics height-
ened, enkindled, lit up by feeling." - Matthew Arnold; "[I]t [religion]
may best be described as an emotion resting on a conviction of a harmony
between ourselves and the universe at large." - J.M.E. McTaggart; "A
man's religion is the expression of his ultimate attitude to the universe, the
summed-up meaning and purport of his whole consciousness of things." -
Edward Caird; "To be religious is to effect in some way and in some mea-
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those belief systems that contemplate a deity or other super-
natural force.119 Others would expand the definition to en-
compass belief systems that range beyond theism. 2 ° Many
modern theologians define religion without reference to sub-
stantive criteria. Notably, Paul Tillich, Hans Kung, and
others have defined religion by the psychological function it
serves in the lives of adherents, creating a tautology under
which belief systems that fill a role usually filled by traditional
religions are religions.12 '
Because no consensus as to the precise meaning of the
word religion exists, 22 its nature is better left undefined and
treated simply as "a problem in the philosophy of reli-
gion. ' 123 Unfortunately, implementation of the Lemon test re-
quires some functional definition. In order to determine
whether an activity advances or inhibits religion, courts must
know what is encompassed by that term. In most cases the
courts have not been forced to test the boundaries of the "se-
mantic penumbra of the word 'religion,' 1124 simply taking
for granted that traditional theistic religions fall within the
definition. 25 Claims involving nontraditional religious beliefs,
however, are more perplexing.
sure a vital adjustment. . . to whatever is reacted to or regarded implicitly
or explicitly as worthy of serious and ulterior concern." - Vergilius Ferm.
7 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 141 (1972).
119. R. STARK & W. BAINBRIDGE, THE FUTURE OF" RELIGION: SECULARI-
ZATION, REVIVAL AND CULT FORMATION 3 (1985) (citations omitted). See also
P. BERGER, THE SACRED CANOPY (1967); M. SPIRO, CULTURE AND HUMAN NA-
TURE (1987).
120. STARK & BAINBRIDGE, supra note 119, at 3 (citations omitted).
See also R. BELLAH, BEYOND BELIEF (1970); P. TILLICH, WHAT IS RELIGION?
(1973); J. YINGER, RELIGION, SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL (1957).
121. Both Tillich and Kung define religion by its psychological func-
tion and assert that everyone has a religion; that is, everyone has some
belief that fills the role in life usually filled by religion. Tillich frames the
analysis in terms of a person's "ultimate concern," a term adopted by the
Court in United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 187 (1965). See ULTIMATE
CONCERN; TILLICH IN DIALOGUE (D. Brown ed. 1965); H. KUNG, DOES GOD
EXIST? AN ANSWER FOR TODAY (E. Quinn trans. 1980). See also D. CARMODY
& J. CARMODY, RELIGION: THE GREAT QUESTIONS 2 (1983) ("In our view,
religion is the dimension of human life that deals with ultimate questions.
The great issues of where we came from, where we are going, and what we
ought to live for comprise religion's living heart."); cf. A. REINES, POLYDOXY
(1987) (every individual's religion is his response to finitude, the realization
of limited existence).
122. See supra note 118.
123. 7 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 140 (1972).
124. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 352 (1970) (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
125. See Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 201 (3d Cir. 1979) (Adams,
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1. The Expansive First Amendment Definition
Guidelines for determining what constitutes a religion
for first amendment purposes can be gleaned from Supreme
Court decisions. Early decisions comported with conventional
Western concepts, limiting religion to theistic belief.126 Al-
though this approach may have been appropriate to nine-
teenth-century America when religious pluralism meant a
plurality of theistic religions,127 a broader concept of religion
was necessary to respect the prolific religious diversification
that occurred in the twentieth century. 28
Judicial acceptance of a broad concept of religion is logi-
cal given the underlying purpose of the religion clauses,
namely, religious liberty. 2 Although more explicitly stated
in the free exercise clause, voluntarism is the essence of reli-
gious freedom in both the free exercise clause and the estab-
J., concurring) (pointing out that through the nineteenth century, defini-
tions of religion were tied to a belief in God). See infra note 127 and ac-
companying text.
126. See United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931) (see infra
note 141); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890) (The Court defined
religion as "one's views of his relations to his Creator.
127. L. TRIBE, supra note 16, § 14-6, at 1179.
128. In the 1960s and early 1970s hundreds of new religions, both
theistic and nontheistic, appeared in society. Wuthnow, Religious Movements
and Counter-movements in North America, in NEW RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS AND
RAPID SOCIAL CHANGE 4-8 (J. Beckford ed. 1986). See generally MELTON'S
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN RELIGIONS (1983) (recognizing hundreds of re-
ligions-theistic and nontheistic, traditional and nontraditional-with a
presence in America including, e.g., Zen Buddhism, the Unification
Church, the Process Church, the Christian World Liberation Front, Hare
Krishna, etc.).
Traditional religions have also diversified by shifting focus from a "theo-
centric, transcendental perspective to forms of religious consciousness that
stress the immanence of meaning in the natural order." L. TRIBE, supra
note 16, § 14-6, at 1180 (footnote omitted).
129.
When the Constitution's Framers wrote the religion clauses they
hoped to end the history of religious persecution and civil war that
had plagued humankind for so long. Their effort has largely, but
not perfectly, succeeded. That success is partly a direct result of
the rules established by the religion clauses. . . . The constitu-
tional guarantee of religious liberty provides a legal mechanism by
which any individual who thinks his religious liberty is violated
may call the government to account judicially . . ..
Laycock, A Survey of Religious Liberty in the United States, 47 OHIO ST. L.J.
409, 451 (1986).
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lishment clause. 1 0 Realistically, belief systems compete for
the minds and souls of individuals in the marketplace of
ideas." ' To protect the voluntary nature of religious affilia-
tion, all systems that compete with conventional religions
should be treated as religions. 3 Under a narrower view, ad-
herents to nontheistic religions might lose the freedom of
voluntary affiliation or gain the power of establishment. Any
definition appropriate for the concerns of the religion clauses
must encompass all belief systems that compete for the reli-
gious mind. The Supreme Court has chosen to give religion
such a definition.
In the 1940s, courts began to depart from a definition
limited to "one's views of his relations to his Creator. "13 In
United States v. Kauten,13 4 the Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit asserted that "[r]eligious belief arises from a
sense of the inadequacy of reason as a means of relating the
individual to his fellow-men and to his universe . ... 135
The Supreme Court followed in United States v. Ballard, stat-
ing that sincerity, not creed, is the most important factor in
categorizing beliefs as religious or nonreligious.3 '
In the 1960s two Supreme Court cases, Welsh v. United
States13 7 and United States v. Seeger,1 clarified the meaning of
religion by adopting a position similar to that proposed in
Kauten. In Seeger, the Court construed the meaning of reli-
gious belief as used in a federal statute exempting conscien-
tious objectors from military service. The statute provided an
exemption for persons who are conscientiously opposed to
130. L. TRIBE, supra note 16, § 14-3, at 1160-61 (voluntarism is the
most fundamental goal of the religion clauses). See also Note, Toward a Con-
stitutional Definition of Religion, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1056, 1058 (1978) (volun-
tarism is the implicit goal of the establishment clause).
131. See Note, The Myth of Religious Neutrality By Separation in Educa-
tion, 71 VA. L. REV. 127, 166 (1985).
132. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 696 (1970) (Harlan, J.,
concurring) (arguing that neutrality should be viewed in an equal protec-
tion mode of analysis). See also Note, supra note 131, at 164-69 (proposing
that establishment clause analysis should be governed by principles analo-
gous to "broad rights of free expression and access to a variety of ideas"
already protected in public education).
133. Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890).
134. 133 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1943).
135. Id. at 708.
136. 322 U.S. 78, 86-88 (1944) (stating that courts may question the
sincerity of claimed religious beliefs, but may not attempt to assess the cor-
rectness of those beliefs).
137. 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
138. 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
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participation in war because of religious training and be-
lief.13 9 The term religious belief was defined by the statute as
"an individual's belief in a relation to a Supreme Being in-
volving duties superior to those arising from any human rela-
tion . . "140 The Court concluded that in using the term
Supreme Being rather than the term God, Congress was merely
clarifying the meaning of religious belief to embrace all reli-
gions."' Within that context the Court granted exemptions
to petitioners who based their claims on beliefs that fell
outside of conventional definitions of religion. Seeger, for ex-
ample, admitted a skepticism concerning the existence of
God and asserted
a "belief in and devotion to goodness and virtue for their
own sakes, and a religious faith in a purely ethical creed."
. . .He cited such personages as Plato, Aristotle and Spi-
noza for support of his ethical belief in intellectual and
moral integrity "without belief in God, except in the remot-
est sense." '142
In concluding that Seeger's beliefs were religious beliefs
that qualified for a conscientious objector's exemption, the
Court adopted a functional definition of religion. 4 Relying
on the works of theologians including Paul Tillich, the Court
ruled that religion should be defined by its psychological
function, stating that the question of religion turns on
139. Universal Military Training and Service Act § 6(j), 50 U.S.C.
App. § 4560) (1958).
140. Id.
141. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 165-66. The language of the statute's explan-
atory phrase was apparently taken from United States v. Macintosh, 283
U.S. 605 (1931), where Chief Justice Hughes wrote, "The essence of reli-
gion is belief in a relation to God involving duties superior to those arising
from any human relation." Id. at 633-34. The Seeger Court reasoned that
Congress had substituted the word Supreme Being for the word God in order
to broaden the definition of religion to include nontraditional beliefs. See-
ger, 380 U.S. at 175-76.
142. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 166 (citations omitted).
143. Id. at 187.
144. Id. The Court quoted Dr. Tillich as some length:
"I have written of the God above the God of theism .... In
such a state [of self-affirmation] the God of both religious and the-
ological language disappears. But something remains, namely, the
seriousness of that doubt in which meaning within meaningless-
ness is affirmed. The source of this affirmation of meaning within
meaninglessness, of certitude within doubt, is not the God of
traditional theism but the 'God above God,' the power of being,
which works through those who have no name for it, not even the
name God."
Id. at 180 (quoting 2 TILLICH, SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY 12 (1957)).
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whether a given belief is an "ultimate concern"1 5 which oc-
cupies the same place in the life of its possessor as the belief
in a supernatural deity occupies in traditionally religious
persons. 146
Five years after Seeger, the Court again construed the
meaning of religious belief in the context of the military ex-
emption statute. In Welsh, a case factually similar to Seeger,
the Court found that Welsh's general moral and ethical oppo-
sition to war, "formed 'by reading in the fields of history and
sociology,' " constituted a religious belief.14 In reaching this
conclusion, the Court noted:
Most of the great religions of today and of the past
have embodied the idea of a Supreme Being or a Supreme
Reality-a God-who communicates to man in some way a
consciousness of what is right and should be done, of what
is wrong and therefore should be shunned. If an individual
deeply and sincerely holds beliefs that are purely ethical or
moral in source and content but that nevertheless impose
upon him a duty of conscience to refrain from participating
in any war at any time, those beliefs certainly occupy in the
life of that individual "a place parallel to that filled by...
God" in traditionally religious persons. 48
Thus, psychological function, not supernatural content, de-
termine the religious nature of the belief. Within this para-
digm theistic belief is but one type of religious belief.
Nontheistic belief, including secular humanism, may be an-
other type.
The Court also consulted Dr. David Saville Muzzey of the Ethical Cul-
ture Movement who wrote that everyone believes in God, the only question
being "what kind of God," id. at 182-83 (quoting D. MUZZEY, ETHICS AS A
RELIGION 86-87 (1951) (emphasis in original)), and Anglican Bishop John
A.T. Robinson who commented on society's growing disbelief in a God
who is "up there" or "out there." Id. at 181 (quoting J. ROBINSON, HONEST
TO GOD 13-16 (1963)).
145. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 187 (1965) (quoting P.
TILLICH, THE SHAKING OF THE FOUNDATIONS 53 (1948)).
146. Id. at 176.
147. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 341 (1970) (citation
omitted).
148. Id. at 340.
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2. The Bifurcated First Amendment Definition
The cases dealing with the expansive definition of reli-
gion have been decided under the free exercise clause. Con-
sequently, some commentators have promoted limiting the
expansive definition to that clause and using a narrower defi-
nition for the establishment clause. Professor Laurence H.
Tribe promulgated a popular definition under which religion
includes any belief that is "arguably religious" for free exer-
cise clause purposes and excludes every belief "arguably non-
religious" for establishment clause purposes. 49 The argu-
ment for this bifurcated definition recognizes the need for an
expansive definition in light of religious diversity. The argu-
ment also presupposes a danger if the expansive definition is
extended to the establishment clause. Theoretically, under
the "ultimate concern/parallel position" concept of religion,
the state could be found entangled with or advancing religion
through social legislation. 5 " Tribe wrote that the expansive
definition might transform the establishment clause into an
"engine of destruction." '
The bifurcated definition, however, cannot be supported
either in theory or in practice. First, there is no constitutional
justification for a bifurcated definition. As Justice Rutledge
pointed out in his dissent to Everson:
"Religion" appears only once in the [first] Amend-
ment. But the word governs two prohibitions and governs
them alike. It does not have two meanings, one narrow to
forbid "an establishment" and another, much broader, for
securing "the free exercise thereof." "Thereof" brings
down "religion" with its entire and exact content, no more
and no less, from the first into the second guaranty ....""
149. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-6, at 828-29
(1978). Approaches similar to the "Tribe" approach have been utilized in a
few cases. See United States v. Allen, 760 F.2d 447, 450-52 (2d Cir. 1985)
(holding that state prosecution of persons who damaged a military aircraft
does not violate the establishment clause, even if the national worship of
nuclear weapons is a religion); Grove v. Mead School Dist. No. 354, 753
F.2d 1528, 1537 (9th Cir.) (Canby, J., concurring), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct.
85 (1985).
150. L. TRIBE, supra note 149, § 14-6, at 831. See also Galanter, Reli-
gious Freedoms in the United States: A Turning Point?, 1966 WIsC. L. REV. 217.
151. L. TRIBE, supra note 149, § 14-6, at 831.
152. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 32 (Rutledge, J., dissent-
ing). For the full text of the first amendment, see supra note 9.
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Setting aside the plain meaning of the religion clauses,
the bifurcated definition cannot be justified because it would
result in a class of religions that enjoy first amendment pro-
tections, yet are immune to first amendment restrictions.
This clearly advantageous position granted to "preferred re-
ligions" is wholly incompatible with the concept of neutrality.
In other words, if the Court wishes to maintain more than
one definition of religion, it can do so only by sacrificing the
neutrality it purports to protect. Further, the specious nature
of the argument for the bifurcated definition is evidenced by
Professor Tribe's recent renouncement of his former posi-
tion.153 Acknowledging that a unitary expansive definition of
religion poses no real danger to social legislation, Tribe cor-
rectly sees room for the government to function without es-
tablishing religion under the expansive definition. 54
3. Secular humanism distinguished from "purely philosoph-
ical" beliefs
Secular humanism fits squarely within the ambit of the
expansive definition of religion because secular humanism is
a comprehensive belief system that addresses ultimate con-
cerns, namely, the nature of man and his relationship with
the universe. The Supreme Court has expressly recognized
secular humanism's religious nature in Torcaso v. Watkins, 55
where the Court noted the existence of "religions in this
country which do not teach what would generally be consid-
ered a belief in the existence of God [including] Buddhism,
Taoism, Ethical Culture, Secular Humanism and others."' 56
The Court, however, clouded the picture in Wisconsin v.
Yoder, '5 stating that purely philosophical beliefs are not reli-
gious. The Court illustrated a "religion-philosophy" spec-
trum, by contrasting the philosophical beliefs of Henry
Thoreau against the religious beliefs of the Amish with little
further clarification.158
153. Compare L. TRIBE, supra note 149, § 14-6, at 828 with L. TRIBE,
supra note 16, § 14-6, at 1186-88 ("The dual definition approach thus con-
stitutes a dubious solution to a problem that, on closer inspection, may not
exist at all.").
154. L. TRIBE, supra note 16, § 14-6, at 1186-87.
155. 367 U.S. 488 (1961). In Torcaso, the Court considered the con-
stitutionality of a Maryland statute requiring public officials to swear an
oath declaring a belief in God. The requirement was found unconstitu-
tional as an infringement on the free exercise of religion. Id. at 495.
156. Id. at 495 n. 11.
157. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). See supra note 52.
158. Id. at 216.
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Though some argue that secular humanism is not a reli-
gion on the religion-philosophy spectrum, it seems clear that
secular humanism is more religious than purely philosophi-
cal.1"9 As previously stated, secular humanism addresses fun-
damental questions usually dealt with in religion. Secular hu-
manism also manifests external signs of being a religion
through formal declarations including "Humanist Manifesto
I,"' 60 "Humanist Manifesto II,' '161 and A Secular Humanist
Declaration;62 organizations like the American Humanist As-
sociation,0 3 the American Ethical Union, 64 the Fellowship of
Religious Humanists,'65 the Fellowship of Humanity; 6' and
established fora for proselytization including The Humanist'67
and Religious Humanism. 6
Like more traditional religions, secular humanism bases
its beliefs upon primary faith assumptions; that is, secular hu-
manism embraces and espouses that which it cannot prove.
Secular humanism denies the existence of the supernatural,
159. Several years after Yoder, Judge Adams of the Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit proposed a widely-cited set of indicia for discerning
religion in Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 207-10 (3d Cir. 1979) (Adams,
J., concurring). Adams' approach asks whether a comprehensive belief sys-
tem addresses the fundamental questions concerning the meaning of life
and death, man's role in the universe, and the proper code of morality.
Adams' approach also examines whether the belief system shows external
signs of being a religion. Notes 160-75 and accompanying text examine
secular humanism in light of Judge Adams' approach.
160. NEW HUMANIST, May-June 1933, at 1 (setting forth the princi-
ples of humanism).
161. THE HUMANIST, Sept.-Oct. 1973, at 4-9 (reaffirming and updat-
ing the principles of humanism which are to "serve as a basis for united
action .... ").
162. P. KURTZ, A SECULAR HUMANIST DECLARATION (1980) (making
ten specific statements that outline the general beliefs and goals of secular
humanists).
163. J. VAN PRAAG, supra note 107, at 50-51.
164. Id.
165. See infra note 168.
166. See Fellowship of Humanity v. County of Alameda, 153 Cal.
App. 2d 673, 315 P.2d 394 (1957) (denying tax-exempt status for a human-
ist group, the Fellowship of Humanity, because the tax exemption was lim-
ited to houses of "worship").
167. The Humanist is a bimonthly magazine published by the Ameri-
can Humanist Association. The introduction to the publication states, "The
Humanist constructively discusses social issues and personal concerns in the
light of humanistic ideas and developments in philosophy, sociology, psy-
chology, and science. ... THE HUMANIST, Jan.-Feb. 1985, at 2.
168. "'Religious Humanism' is a journal of humanistic religion and
ethics published quarterly since 1967" by The Fellowship of Religious Hu-
manists. RELIGIOUS HUMANISM, Winter 1986, at 1.
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accepts the absolutism of evolution, and asserts the
supremacy of reason.'69 None of these propositions can be
substantiated by reason or science alone; all require "a leap
of faith" that transcends rationalism. 17 0
Further, humanists themselves seem to accept secular hu-
manism as a religion. "Humanist Manifesto I" pronounced:
Today man's larger understanding of the universe, his
scientific achievements, and his deeper appreciation of
brotherhood, have created a situation which requires a new
statement of the means and purposes of religion . . . . It is
obvious that any religion that can hope to be a synthesizing
and dynamic force today must be shaped for the needs of
this age. To establish such a religion is a major necessity of
the present. We therefore affirm the following ....
Finally, and perhaps most importantly to this note, secu-
lar humanism identifies an ultimate source of morality.1 71 Ad-
dressing the source of morality is a fundamental aspect of
most traditional religions. While theistic religions generally
view morality as absolute, established by God and revealed to
man, 17 secular humanism views morality as unfixed and de-
rived from internal referents. As A Secular Humanist Declara-
tion states, "We are opposed to Absolutist morality ....
Likewise, "Humanist Manifesto II" pronounces, "We affirm
that moral values derive their source from human experi-
ence. Ethics is autonomous and situational, needing no theolog-
ical or ideological sanction."'7 5
The only definitions under which secular humanism is
not a religion are definitions restricted to theistic concepts.
Such archaic definitions cannot be supported in this era. Un-
less the sincerity of secular humanism's adherents is ques-
tioned, there is no valid reason to exclude it from any defini-
tion of religion, least of all the expansive definition adopted
by the Supreme Court.
169. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
170. See Whitehead & Conlan, supra note 110, at 38-39.
171. Humanist Manifesto I, supra note 160, at 2.
172. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
173. See J. AUER & J. HARTT, HUMANISM VERSUS THEISM 66 (1951). See
also N. HAAN, E. AERTS, & B. COOPER, ON MORAL GROUNDS: THE SEARCH FOR
PRACTICAL MORALITY 20 (1985) (for theistic religions morality is embodied
in God's commands) [hereinafter ON MORAL GROUNDS].
174. P. KURTZ, supra note 162, at 15.
175. Humanist Manifesto II, supra note 19, at 6 (emphasis in original).
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IV. AN IMPERMISSIBLE ADVANCEMENT OF RELIGION: SECULAR
HUMANISM IN PUBLIC EDUCATION
The "effect" prong of the Lemon test requires that gov-
ernment conduct either advance or inhibit religion before
that conduct is unconstitutional.'7 With the acceptance of
secular humanism as a religion, at least for the purposes of
the first amendment, the only question that remains is
whether secular humanism is impermissibly advanced in the
public schools.
In Smith, the district court found the inculcation of rela-
tivistic morality through humanistic values education to be an
impermissible advancement of religion. 7 The circuit court
reversed on the grounds that the curriculum had an "entirely
appropriate secular effect."17 The existence of a valid secu-
lar effect, however, is not dispositive. In Committee for Public
Education v. Nyquist,17 the Supreme Court declared, "Our
cases simply do not support the notion that a law found to
have a 'primary' effect to promote some legitimate end . . .
is immune from further examination to ascertain whether it
also has a direct and immediate effect of advancing reli-
gion." 180 Hence, the existence of a primary secular effect
does not exclude the possibility that a substantial secondary
effect nevertheless would violate the establishment clause.
When governmental conduct has both secular and religious
effects the inquiry is not limited to which is "more primary."
To avoid an establishment clause violation the religious effect
must be remote, indirect and incidental. 8 The following dis-
cussion suggests that the religious effect of the Mobile
County texts was not remote, indirect, and incidental, but
rather was direct and immediate.
A. Secular Humanism in Public Education
Many commentators have written of a conspiracy on the
part of humanists to dominate public education. 82 While
176. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
177. See supra text accompanying notes 96-97.
178. See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
179. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
180. Id. at 783-84 n. 39.
181. Id. at 771. See L. TRIBE, supra note 16, § 14-7, at 1215.
182. See, e.g., T. LAHAYE, THE BATTLE FOR THE PUBLIC ScHooLS (1983)
(discussing secular humanism's "plot" to proselytize through the public
schools). See also H. Cox, THE SECULAR CITY 21 (1965) (noting that secular
humanism "seeks to impose its ideology through the organs of the state").
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conspiracy may be too strong a word, it is clear that secular
humanism's presence in public education is not without de-
sign. To a great extent secular humanism is built into
America's prevailing educational philosophy.18
John Dewey was the primary architect of modern public
education. Dewey was also a self-acknowledged humanist who
endorsed the first "Humanist Manifesto" and affiliated him-
self with the American Humanist Association.'" His commit-
ment to the principles of secular humanism formed the basis
of his educational philosophy, the central themes of which
are experimentalism and pragmatism."1 5 Dewey promoted
science as the basis of all learning and controlled social
change as the goal of education. He believed that morality
should be in accord with the scientific method: moral judg-
ments should be treated as hypotheses, tested only by their
temporal consequences. 8
Today Dewey's philosophy forms the essence of public
education 87 and is most evident in a phenomenon known as
humanistic education. 88 Humanistic education, which fo-
183. See infra notes 187-88 and accompanying text.
184. J. VAN PRAAG, supra note 107, at 50.
185. See generally Dewey, My Pedagogic Creed, in DEWEY ON EDUCA-
TION: SELECTIONS (M. Dworkin ed. 1964); J. DEWEY, EXPERIENCE AND EDUCA-
TION (1963). See also H. CAMPBELL, JOHN DEWEY 35-78 (1971) (discussing
Dewey's "experimental naturalism" theories); G. KNELLER, FOUNDATIONS OF
EDUCATION 64, 99-109 (1963); Peters, John Dewey's Philosophy of Education,
in JOHN DEWEY RECONSIDERED 105-06 (R.S. Peters ed. 1977) (discussing
Dewey's pragmatism).
186. See H. CAMPBELL, supra note 185, at 57; ON MORAL GROUNDS,
supra note 173, at 22 (According to Dewey, "[m]orality lay in whatever
practical actions solve problems.").
187.
It is as well known as anything might be in the realm of education
that John Dewey's ideas have enjoyed wide influence in educa-
tional thinking and discussion, both in America and in other coun-
tries. Throughout the literature there are constant references to
his theories, and there is hardly an intelligent discussion of the
theory or practice of schooling which does not, at some point and
in some manner, take his suggestions into account ...
M. BAKER, FOUNDATIONS OF JOHN DEWEY'S EDUCATIONAL THEORY 1 (1955).
See also D. KOLB, EXPERIENTIAL LEARNING: EXPERIENCE AS THE SOURCE OF
LEARNING AND DEVELOPMENT 5 (1985) ("Dewey [is] without doubt the most
influential educational theorist of the twentieth century .... ").
188. Lawrence Kohlberg, a prominent educational theorist, recog-
nizes Dewey as the forerunner to humanistic approaches to moral educa-
tion. Dewey was the first to recognize "that moral education, like intellec-
tual education, has its basis in stimulating the active thinking of the child
about moral issues and decisions." Kohlberg, The Cognitive-Developmental
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cuses on students' psychological, moral, and social develop-
ment, has been identified as a "comprehensive social and
moral philosophy with specific implications for the design of
curriculum." 18' A number of humanistic approaches have
gained prominence. 9 The Mobile County texts closely
tracked "Value Clarification," '91 the most widely-accepted
humanistic approach. 2 In Value Clarification, children are
not taught values per se, rather they are taught a three-part
valuing process:.9 1) choose values freely, 2) choose values
from among alternatives, and 3) choose after thoughtful con-
sideration of consequences.'9 Reflecting the Value Clarifica-
tion approach, the banned texts promoted a process of value
development that relies solely on internal referents. The
texts were replete with statements such as "Values are per-
sonal and subjective. They vary from person to person""'
and "only you can judge your own values.' 9 6
Approach to Moral Education, in MORAL EDUCATION... IT COMES WITH THE
TERRITORY, supra note 3, at 176 (emphasis in original). See Dewey, What
Psychology Can Do for the Teacher, in JOHN DEWEY ON EDUCATION: SELECTED
WRITINGS (R. Archambault ed. 1964).
For a discussion of the development of humanistic education, see gener-
ally HUMANISTIC FOUNDATIONS OF EDUCATION (C. Weinberg ed. 1972).
189. Note, supra note 7, at 1196-97 (footnotes omitted), 1205. For a
discussion of humanistic psychology's application to education, see Romig
& Cleland, Educational Applications of Humanistic Psychology, in HUMANISTIC
EDUCATION SOURCEBOOK 333-44 (D. Read & S. Simon eds. 1975).
190. See C. BECK, EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY: AN INTRODUCTION 2
(1971) (promoting a humanist moral education approach that assesses all
educational objectives in terms of fundamental life goals such as happiness,
freedom, and survival); L. KOHLBERG, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MORAL DEVELOP-
MENT: THE NATURE AND VALIDITY OF MORAL STAGES (1984) (promoting
Cognitive Moral Education); RATHS, HARMIN, & SIMON, infra note 191 (pro-
moting the approach known as Value Clarification); Wehlage & Lockwood,
Moral Relativism and Values Education, in MORAL EDUCATION . .. IT COMES
WITH THE TERRITORY, supra note 3, at 330-31 (discussing the humanistic
value education approach known as Cognitive Moral Development).
191. See L. RATHS, M. HARMIN, & S. SIMON, VALUES AND TEACHING
(1966) (promoting a value processing system in which right and wrong are
entirely relative depending upon the situation and upon the child's point of
view) [hereinafter VALUES AND TEACHING]. See also S. SIMON & H. KIRSCHEN-
BAUM, READINGS IN VALUES CLARIFICATION (1973).
192. Values Clarification is "ten times the most popular" among val-
ues education methods. K. Gow, YES, VIRGINIA, THERE IS RIGHT AND WRONG
18 (1985).
193. VALUES AND TEACHING, supra note 191, at 28-29. See also Simon
& Massey, Value Clarification, in HUMANISTIC EDUCATION SOURCEBOOK, supra
note 189, at 388-90 (analogizing the discovery of personal values to an
archeological expedition).
194. VALUES AND TEACHING, supra note 191, at 28-29.
195. Smith v. Board of School Comm'rs, 655 F. Supp. 939, 1004
app. N (S.D. Ala. 1987) (quoting F. PARNELL, supra note 87, at 16).
196. Id. at 1002 (quoting J. KELLY, supra note 87, at 26).
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Like other humanistic educational approaches, Value
Clarification is designed to suffuse relativistic morality into all
subjects.""7 Typically, the teacher presents students with a
moral dilemma upon which each student gives an opinion.
The teacher then leads a discussion designed to cause the stu-
dent to consider the consequences of his position and to scru-
tinize his opinion in light of those consequences.' 98 Humanis-
tic values education is predicated on the assumptions that
absolute values do not exist and that children will develop
positive values from within through self-reflection.'" As the
creators of Value Clarification have indicated, the basis of hu-
manistic values education is
a conception of humanity that says human beings hold the
possibility of being thoughtful and wise and that the most
appropriate values will come when persons use their intelli-
gence freely and reflectively to define their relationships
with each other and with an ever-changing world. Further-
more, it is based on the idea that values are personal things
if they exist at all . .. .0
B. Relativistic Morality: The Direct and Immediate Effect
The problem with humanistic approaches such as that
employed by the banned texts is a failure to differentiate be-
tween moral and nonmoral values.2 0' As one of the texts
stated, "'[T]he steps in decision-making can be applied to
something as simple as buying a new pair of shoes' and 'can
also be applied to more complex decisions such as those
which involve religious preferences; education and career
choices; use of alcohol, tobacco and drugs; and sexual hab-
its.' ",202 While the relativistic approach may be innocuous as
197. Note, supra note 7, at 1205 n. 43.
198. Id. at 1206-07. For a brief survey of other Values Clarification
activities, see Harmin & Simon, How to Help Students Learn to Think ...
About Themselves, in HUMANISTIC EDUCATION SOURCEBOOK, supra note 189,
at 400-08. See also S. SIMON, L. HOWE, & H. KIRSCHENBAUM, VALUES CLARIFI-
CATION: A HANDBOOK OF PRACTICAL STRATEGIES FOR TEACHERS AND STU-
DENTS (1972).
199. Note, supra note 7, at 1205.
200. VALUES AND TEACHING, supra note 191, at 39.
201. K. Gow, supra note 192, at 52.
202. Smith v. Board of School Comm'rs, 827 F.2d 684, 691 n.5 (11 th
Cir. 1987) (quoting F. PARNELL, supra note 87, at 26).
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a method of choosing shoes, it takes on significant religious
import as a method of deciding-moral questions.
Moreover, relativistic morality is more than merely a
principle of secular humanism; it is the very essence of that
religion. Given the definition of secular humanism offered in
the previous section, relativistic morality clearly embodies
each tenet described.203 The acceptance of relativistic moral-
ity denies the existence of absolute morality, thereby implic-
itly denying God or, at least, denying his relevance. Relativis-
tic morality emphasizes the importance of humans and the
temporal world, and relativistic morality reflects a confidence
in reason by declaring it as the true source of moral
judgment.
Finding that the concept of morality "strikes at the
heart" of theistic religions, the district court in Smith asserted
that the denial of such a fundamental belief completely un-
dermines those religions.'" "In addition, denial of that belief
will result in the affirmance of a contrary belief and result in
the establishment of an opposing religion."2 5 It is true that
differing beliefs, and even differing belief systems, are often
compatible; however, at certain levels, a particular perspec-
tive can preclude all other beliefs.2"6 Relativistic morality is
such a perspective. Indeed, theistic morality has no place in a
belief system that is completely derived from internal
referents.
In the sensitive area of public education, where children
are captive and impressionable, the inculcation of a religious
perspective on morality cannot be permitted. Although the
circuit court found the banned texts neutral toward values, it
is clear that humanistic values education promotes a very sub-
jective and limited point of view.20 7 Thus, while the religious
effect is arguably secondary, it is nevertheless direct and im-
mediate, constituting a violation of the establishment clause.
In Smith v. Board of School Commissioners,08 Judge Hand
was faced with the task of applying establishment clause juris-
prudence to a belief system which has perhaps become indis-
tinguishable from the state's educational enterprise as a
203. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
204. Smith v. Board of School Comm'rs, 655 F. Supp. 939, 987 (S.D.
Ala. 1987).
205. Id. (emphasis in original).
206. See C. GLOCK & R. STARK, supra note 119, at 5-7.
207. See K. Gow, supra note 192, at 168.
208. 655 F. Supp. 939 (S.D. Ala. 1987).
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whole. To that end, he rendered a technically correct, but
inherently problematic, decision. Faithful analysis under ex-
isting establishment clause jurisprudence requires the exclu-
sion of secular humanism from public schools, as it has re-
quired the exclusion of traditional religions.
C. Proposal: The Balanced Approach
Excluding secular humanism from public education
presents a quandary because removal of humanistic values ed-
ucation seems both impossible and, in some ways, undesir-
able. The impossibility stems from the pervasive nature of
secular thought. The undesirability relates to the inevitable
reappearance of a void in moral education." 9 The quandary
can be avoided by requiring public schools to present diverse
ideological viewpoints, including religious ones, in values ed-
ucation.210 This approach, called "balanced treatment" or
"aggressive pluralism," would allow the reintroduction into
the classroom of some traditional religious views that would
"compete" with humanistic and other views in the market
place of ideas.21
Although neutral toward religion, the balanced approach
easily could be construed as conflicting with existing estab-
lishment clause jurisprudence." 2 The main obstacle to al-
lowing a balanced approach to values education is the mis-
taken, but well-ingrained, belief that the Constitution
209. It has been proposed that morality can be inculcated without
religious effect by avoiding the reasons or sources behind moral standards.
See Note, supra note 7, at 1223 (proposing that moral education need not
explore moral issues or delve into the source of morality). But see K. Gow,
supra note 192, at 16-17 ("To reduce values education to mere rule-giving
and to define morality as obedient conformity, rather than compassionate
and reasoned commitment, is to retard students' growth and development
in moral sensitivity and to prevent them from thinking intelligently.").
210. See Note, supra note 131, at 164-69.
211. "Because religion in the classroom is inevitable, anything short
of aggressive pluralism will necessarily result in the pall of orthodoxy and
establishment of ideology that the first amendment was designed to avoid."
Id. at 167.
212. A balanced treatment approach to values education that in-
cludes the presentation of traditional religious viewpoints would not neces-
sarily violate existing jurisprudence. In Schempp, the Court acknowledged
that religion may be studied in public schools as part of a secular program
of education. School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203, 225 (1963). But cf. Edwards v. Aguillard, 107 S. Ct. 2573 (1987) (strik-
ing down a Louisiana statute requiring a balanced presentation of creation-
science and evolution when either is taught in public schools).
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mandates separation of religion and government." 3 The
plain language of the establishment clause, that "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion
. . .," contains no mention of separation.21 4 The text sug-
gests nothing more than a prohibition against a national reli-
gion, a proposition consistent with the disposition of the
framers, who were, by and large, theists holding beliefs that
religion played an important role in society.2"5 Their motiva-
tion in drafting the establishment clause was not a desire to
completely separate religion and government, but a desire to
protect against an established national religion and to pro-
hibit preferential aid to specific sects.210 In the words of his-
torian Wilbur Katz:
Except for occasional flights of rhetoric, no one con-
tends either that absolute separation of church and state is
required by the First Amendment or that such a rule would
be desirable. Nor does the concept of separation provide its
own principle of limitation. In determining the limits of
constitutional separation, it is the concept of religious free-
213. The idea that the Constitution mandates separation arises from
Everson and its progeny. The Everson Court primarily based its reading of
the establishment clause on its interpretation of constitutional history, fo-
cusing specifically on the lives and works of Thomas Jefferson and James
Madison. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8-13 (1946). But see
Smith, infra note 216, at 594 (Madison "never advocated by word or action
.. . strict separation.").
214. For the full text of the amendment, see supra note 9. See also
Kauper, Church and State: Cooperative Separatism, 60 MICH. L. REV. 1, 4-7
(1961) (discussing the lack of constitutional support for the proposition of
strict separation).
215. Berman, The Interaction of Law and Religion, 31 MERCER L. REV.
405, 406 (1980).
216. See generally R. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: His-
TORICAL FACT AND CURRENT FICTION 15 (1982) ("First, [the establishment
clause] was intended to prevent the establishment of a national church or
religion, or the giving of any religious sect or denomination a preferred
status. Second, it was designed to safeguard the right of freedom of con-
science in religious beliefs against invasion solely by the national Govern-
ment. Third, it was so constructed to allow the States, unimpeded, to deal
with religious- establishments and aid to religious institutions as they saw
fit."). See also M. MALBIN, RELIGION AND POLITICS: THE INTENTIONS OF THE
AUTHORS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1978) (arguing that the framers did
not intend strict separation, but intended to allow nonpreferential aid to
religion); Smith, Getting Off on the Wrong Foot and Back on Again: A Reexami-
nation of the History of the Framing of the Religion Clauses of the First Amend-
ment and a Critique of the Reynolds and Everson Decisions, 20 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 569 (1984) (also arguing that the framers intended to allow non-
preferential aid to religion).
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dom which provides the criterion. The principle of church-
state separation is an instrumental principle.2 17
Nevertheless, the present Court has not willingly con-
formed to the intent of the framers.218 Justice Stevens wrote
in Jaffree that the Court has examined the underlying princi-
ple of the establishment clause "in the crucible of litigation"
and has set forth precedent by which it is now bound.219 The
Court should not continue, however, to promote a historical
mistake. As Justice Rehnquist retorted in dissent to Jaffree,
"The 'crucible of litigation,' . . is well adapted to adjudicat-
217. Katz, The Case for Religious Liberty, in RELIGION IN AMERICA 97 (J.
Cogley ed. 1958).
218. In Jaffree, the Court impliedly accepted the historical view that
the framers did not intend strict separation. Delivering the opinion of the
Court, Justice Stevens stated, "[T]he individual's freedom to choose his
own creed is the counterpart of his right to refrain from accepting the
creed established by the majority. At one time it was thought that this
right merely proscribed the preference of one Christian sect over another
. .. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 52 (1985). Stevens specifically re-
lied upon Justice Joseph Story's account of history:
"Probably at the time of the adoption of the constitution, and of
the amendment to it, now under consideration [First Amend-
ment], the general, if not universal sentiment in America was, that
christianity ought to receive encouragement from the state, so far
as was not incompatible with private rights of conscience, and the
freedom of religious worship. An attempt to level all religions, and
to make it a matter of state policy to hold all in utter indifference,
would have created universal disapprobation, if not universal
indignation ...
The real object of the amendment was, not to countenance,
much less to advance, Mahometanism, or Judaism, or infidelity, by
prostrating christianity; but to exclude all rivalry among christian
sects, and to prevent any national ecclesiastical establishment, which
should give to a hierarchy the exclusive patronage of the national govern-
ment. It thus cut off the means of religious persecution, (the vice and pest
of former ages,) and of the subversion of the rights of conscience in mat-
ters of religion, which had been trampled upon almost from the
days of the Apostles to the present age .... "
472 U.S. 38, 52 n.36 (quoting 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITU-
TION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1874, at 593, and § 1877, at 594 (1851)
(footnote omitted by Court) (emphasis added by Court)). But see L. PFEFFER,
GOD, CAESER, AND THE CONSTITUTION (1975) (arguing that the framers did
intend a strict separation of religion and government); Laycock, "Nonpref-
erential" Aid to Religion: A False Claim About Original Intent, 27 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 875 (1986) (arguing that the Framers did not intend to allow non-
preferential aid to religion).
For a good historical overview, see T. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS:
CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA TO THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
(1986).
219. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 52 (1984).
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ing factual disputes on the basis of testimony presented in
court, but no amount of repetition of historical errors in judi-
cial opinions can make the errors true.
220
CONCLUSION
A return to the Framers' ideals does not necessarily re-
quire complete abandonment of separation. While the Con-
stitution does not mandate separation, the doctrine can be
utilized, indeed is useful, as a mechanism for achieving estab-
lishment clause goals in certain contexts. Separation should
not be utilized, however, in contexts where it is not useful,
such as public education.
The Court refined its jurisprudence when the growth of
government and diversification of religion made strict separa-
tion an untenable proposition. 22' This note reveals that sepa-
ration continues as an untenable proposition in the area of
values education in public schools. Consequently, the Court
should not hesitate to refine establishment clause jurispru-
dence as long as that refinement promotes neutrality and
protects voluntarism.
As this note has shown, secular humanism is a religion, a
religion advanced by the public schools through the inculca-
tion of relativistic morality. Under the Supreme Court's pre-
sent establishment clause jurisprudence, public schools can-
not continue to present a single perspective on morality
without violating the establishment clause. Rather than pro-
hibit the schools from teaching humanistic values, however,
this note suggests that the Court simply modify its jurispru-
dence in the sensitive area of moral education. While it is
clearly beyond the scope of this note to work out with preci-
sion the Court's exact path in formulating that remedy, this
note suggests that the Court abrogate its "neutrality through
separation" approach in favor of a "neutrality through plu-
ralism" approach. Such an approach would protect the over-
riding purpose of the establishment clause without inhibiting
public education's express goal to instill in children values
necessary to the maintenance of a democratic society.2
220. Id. at 107 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
221. See supra notes 50-60 and accompanying text.
222. Supra note 2.
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